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Abstract. The past twenty years have seen the launch of more than 60 “university-class” spacecraft (i.e., spacecraft
whose mission in part is to train students in spacecraft engineering), with perhaps 25 more to launch in the second
half of this calendar year. And of those 25, twenty are CubeSats, with that trend on the increase.
The on-orbit success and on-orbit utility of these missions has varied widely; some never made it off the rocket,
some were deployed but never turned on, while others have been functional for decades.
This paper will review the past twenty years of student-built small satellites. From that data, we will draw broad
conclusions about the typical scope and probability of success of these spacecraft. Also, using this information, and
drawing from the author's experience and interviews with small spacecraft builders, we will address three questions
for future university-class missions:
1) Are CubeSats the dominant future for ALL university-class missions, or simply a 'phase'?
2) What kinds of missions are well-suited for student-built satellites? Are there enough to go around?
3) Are student-built satellites worth the effort? Are there more cost-effective (and mission-effective) ways to train
spacecraft engineers?
Definition: “University-Class” Satellite

INTRODUCTION

We prefer the term “university-class satellite” over
“student satellite”, because the latter has exceedingly
broad usage; multimillion-dollar NASA science
missions and 3-kg Sputnik re-creations both have been
called “student” spacecraft. For the purposes of this
discussion, a university-class satellite has these
features:

In the calendar year ending 31 December, 2006, it is
anticipated that at least 27 university-class spacecraft
will be put into orbit – which is more than twice as
many as any previous year. In fact, more student-built
satellites are expected to launch in 2006 than were
launched from 1981-1999. And, if only a modest
fraction of these spacecraft succeed on-orbit, we can
expect to see many more in future years; informal
estimates place the number of universities worldwide
with pre-flight hardware at greater than 75.

1.

While none can deny that student-built spacecraft are an
established fact, there is little discussion in either the
education or engineering literature about the merits of
this fact. Should universities be in the practice of
building and launching their own spacecraft? Given the
tremendous costs of building and operating universityclass spacecraft – measured in student hours, faculty
hours, dollars spent, items donated and, especially, the
long times between flight operations – are student-built
spacecraft worth the cost?

2.

3.

Before we can proceed with the discussion, we need to
clearly define what it is we mean by a university-class
satellite project.
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It is a functional spacecraft, rather than a payload
instrument or component. To fit the definition,
the device must operate in space with its own
independent means of communications and
command. However, self-contained objects that
are attached to other vehicles are allowed under
this definition (e.g. PCSat-2).
Untrained personnel (i.e. students) performed a
significant fraction of key design decisions,
integration & testing activities, and flight
operations.
The training of these people was as important as
(if not more important) the nominal “mission” of
the spacecraft itself.

Therefore, a university-class satellite is defined by
programmatic constraints and is distinct from a space
mission with strong university participation. The
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Finally, we must admit unfortunate timing: two weeks
after this paper is due, a Dnepr rocket is scheduled to
launch 14 CubeSats and two other university-class
spacecraft.
The success or failure of those 16
spacecraft will have a large impact on the results
presented below. We will revise our paper and the
conference presentation based on whatever data is
available by August 2006.

purpose of university-class missions is to train students
in the design, integration and operation of spacecraft,
and this is accomplished by giving students direct
control over the progress of the program.
Many spacecraft with strong university connections do
not fit this definition, especially those where the
university contributes the primary payload. Similarly,
while some spacecraft in the amateur radio service are
university-class, there are many with the OSCAR
designation that do not fit the definition.

A SMALL HISTORY OF UNIVERSITY-CLASS
SATELLITES

Exclusion from the “university class” category does not
imply a lack of educational value on a project’s part; it
simply indicates that other factors were more important
than student education (e.g., schedule or on-orbit
performance).

A list of university-class spacecraft launched from 1981
until the writing of this paper (12 June 2006) is
provided in Table 1. Because the inclusion or omission
of a spacecraft from this list may prove to be a
contentious issue – not to mention the designation of
whether a vehicle failed prematurely, it is worth
discussing the process for creating these tables.

Finally, it should also be noted that NASA’s University
Explorer (UNEX) program sometimes calls its
spacecraft “university-class missions”, although the
university participation to date has been concentrated
on the instruments and overall mission responsibility;
professional contractors have built the spacecraft. None
of the UNEX missions to date fit our definition of
university-class (though they are not categorically
excluded).

First, a list of all university-related small satellites that
reached orbit (however low) was assembled from
launch logs, the author’s knowledge and several
satellite databases.1-4 Because of the difficulty in
compiling and verifying information about spacecraft
that were not completed, we have only included
projects with a verifiable launch date. Furthermore,
missions that did not meet the definition of “universityclass” as defined above were removed from this list.

Paper Overview
We return to the question:
are university-class
spacecraft the best use of university resources? In order
to answer this question, we will first review the history
of university-class spacecraft, from 1981 through midJune 2006. From that review, we will make general
observations about the types of missions pursued, the
types of universities participating, and prospects for
success or failure on-orbit. Given those observations,
we will attempt to address that question, as well as a
number of others about subsystem reliability, mission
design and proper scoping of projects.

The remaining spacecraft were researched regarding
mission duration, mass and mission categories, with
information derived from published reports and project
websites as indicated. A Tech mission flight-tests a
new component or subsystem (new to the satellite
industry, not just new to the university). A Science
mission creates science data relevant to that particular
field of study (including remote sensing). A Comm
mission provides communications services to some part
of the world (often in the Amateur radio service).
While every university-class mission is by definition
educational, those spacecraft listed as Edu missions
lack any of the other payloads and serve mainly to train
students and improve the satellite-building capabilities
of that particular school. Finally, a spacecraft is
indicated to have failed prematurely when its
operational lifetime was significantly less than
published reports predicted and/or if the university who
created the spacecraft indicate that it failed.

However, we do not claim to have the final
authoritative word on the matter. Rather, we hope that
this paper continues a meaningful conversation on the
proper role for university-class missions.
Disclaimers
This information was compiled from online sources,
past conference proceedings and author interviews with
students and faculty at many universities, as noted in
the references. The opinions expressed in this paper are
just that, opinions, reflecting the author’s experience as
both student project manager and faculty advisor to
university-class projects. The author accepts sole
responsibility for any factual (or interpretative) errors
found in this paper and welcomes any corrections.
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This list of spacecraft and their respective details is
complete to the best of the author’s ability; certain
aspects are known to be incomplete and are noted as
such. For example, the listed launch masses should be
considered approximate, as the variance in mass among
different published records can reach as high as 50%.
Similarly, values in the Mission Duration column are
approximate; in the course of our research, we found
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Table 1. University-Class Spacecraft Launched Between 1981 and 2003 (references 1,2,3,4 unless noted).
Launch
1981
1984
1985
1990
1991
1992
1993
1993
1994
1994
1996
1997
1997
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
2002
2002
2002
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006
3000
3001
3002
3003

Spacecraft
Primary School(s)
UoSAT-1 (UO-9)
University of Surrey (UK)
UoSAT-2 (UO-11)
University of Surrey (UK)
NUSAT
Weber State, Utah State University
WeberSAT (WO-18) Weber State
TUBSAT-A
Technical University of Berlin
KITSAT-1 (KO-23) Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
ARSENE
CNES Amateurs
KITSAT-2 (KO-25) Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
TUBSAT-B
Technical University of Berlin
BremSat
University of Bremen
UNAMSAT-B (MO-30)National University of Mexico
Falcon Gold
US Air Force Academy
RS-17
Russian high school students
TUBSAT-N
Technical University of Berlin
TUBSAT-N1
Technical University of Berlin
Techsat 1-B (GO-32) Technion Institute of Technology
PANSAT (PO-34)
Naval Postgraduate School
SEDSAT (SO-33)
University of Alabama, Huntsville
Sunsat (SO-35)
University of Stellenbosch
KITSAT-3
Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
DLR-TUBSAT
Technical University of Berlin
JAWSAT (WO-39) Weber State, USAFA
Falconsat 1
US Air Force Academy
Opal (OO-38)
Stanford University
ASUsat 1 (AO-37)
Arizona State University
JAK
Santa Clara University
Louise
Santa Clara University
Thelma
Santa Clara University
Tsinghua-1
Tsinghua University
TiungSAT-1 (MO-46) ATSB
UNISAT 1
University of Rome "La Sapienza"
SO-41 Saudisat 1A King Abdulaziz City for Science & Technology
SO-42 Saudisat 1B King Abdulaziz City for Science & Technology
Munin
Umeå University / Luleå University of Technology
Sapphire (NO-45)
Stanford, USNA, Washington University
PCSat 1 (NO-44)
US Naval Academy
Maroc-TUBSAT
Technical University of Berlin
Kolibri-2000
Space Research Institute
UNISAT 2
University of Rome "La Sapienza"
Saudisat 1C (SO-50) King Abdulaziz City for Science & Technology
MOST
University of Toronto
QuakeSat
Stanford University
AAU Cubesat
University of Aalborg
CanX-1
University of Toronto
CUTE-1 (CO-55)
Tokyo Institute of Technology
DTUsat
Technical University of Denmark
XI-IV (CO-57)
University of Tokyo
Mozhayets 4 (RS-22) Mozhaisky military academy
STSAT-1
Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
Naxing-1 (NS-1)
Tsinghua University
SaudiSat 2
King Abdulaziz City for Science & Technology
UNISAT 3
University of Rome "La Sapienza"
3CS: Ralphie
ASU/NMSU/CU Boulder
3CS: Sparky
ASU/NMSU/CU Boulder
PCSat 2
US Naval Academy
Mozhayets 5
Mozhaisky military academy
SSETI Express (XO-53)
European Universities
Ncube II
Norwegian Universities
XI-V (CO-58)
University of Tokyo
UWE-1
University of Würzburg
CUTE-1.7 (CO-56) Tokyo Institute of Technology
Falconsat 2
US Air Force Academy
Still operational
Semioperational
Nonoperational
Premature loss of operations (or severely degraded operations)
Launch failure
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Mission
Primary
Mass Duration
Mission
Nation
(kg)
(months)
Type
Ref
UK
52
98 Science
13
UK
60
271 Comm
14
USA
52
20 Tech
15
USA
16
97 Comm
16
Germany
35
181 Comm
6
Korea
49
78 Tech
12, 25
France
154
4 Comm
22
Korea
48
98 Comm
12, 54
Germany
40
1 Tech?
6
Germany
63
12 Science
Mexico
10
0.0 Comm
USA
18
1 Tech
Russia
3
2 Edu
5
Germany
9
46 Tech
6
Germany
3
20 Tech
6
Israel
70
52 Science
61
USA
70
68? Comm
46
USA
41
12? Tech
7
South Africa
64
23 Comm
23
Korea
110
55 Tech
12, 24
Germany
45
86 Science
6, 21, 48
USA
191
1? Tech
20, 35
USA
52
1 Edu
36
USA
23
29 Tech
38
18, 19, 37
USA
6
0.0 Edu
USA
0.2
0 Edu
39
USA
0.5
0 Science
39
USA
0.5
0 Science
39
China
50
48? Edu
Malaysia
50
40 Edu/Sci
10, 49-53
Italy
12
?? Edu
Saudi Arabia
10
40? Comm
Saudi Arabia
10
40? Comm
Sweden
6
3 Science
8
USA
20
37 Edu
41
USA
12
57 Comm
40, 45
Germany
47
57 Science
47
Russia
21
2 Edu
9
Italy
17
18? Edu
10
Saudi Arabia
10
42 Comm
Canada
60
36 Science
11, 63
USA
3
36 Science
33
Denmark
1
0 Edu
Canada
1
0 Edu
62
Japan
1
36 Edu
Denmark
1
0 Edu
Japan
1
36 Edu
Russia
64?
33 Comm
Korea
100
33 Tech
China
25
26 Tech?
Saudi Arabia
15?
24 Comm?
Italy
12
24 Tech
10
USA
16
0 Edu
34
USA
16
0 Edu
34
USA
12?
10 Comm/Tech
Russia
64
0 Edu/Tech
Europe
62
0 Comm?
Norway
1
0 Edu
Japan
1
8 Edu
Germany
1
8 Edu
Japan
2
4 Comm/Tech
USA
20
0 Science
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banner year of 2000. In fact, the Class of 2000 requires
a section unto itself (see below).

some spacecraft that were known to have lost most or
all of the primary payloads and communications
equipment and yet were still listed as “operational”! In
other cases, spacecraft that have greatly exceeded their
planned mission lifetime may be left idle or even
abandoned by their primary operators, and thus the
failure date of the vehicle is unknown.

Overall, the university-class spacecraft in this decade
are starting to become smaller, although there are still
as many over 40 kg as there are under 10 kg. Also, the
overwhelming majority of these spacecraft have a real
mission, be it Amateur Radio service, technology
demonstrations, or science.

1981-1990: A New Hope?

Unfortunately, this decade sees the first mission
failures. There is also a noticeable bifurcation in the
mission lifetimes: university-class spacecraft either fail
within the first few days of operation or operate for
several years. Still, with the exception of the ill-fated
JAWSAT multi-spacecraft launch (see below), success
rates are surprisingly good: only 4 of 23 failed to meet
their baseline mission objectives.

Our history begins in 1981 with the launch of Surrey’s
UoSAT-1,13 followed by UoSAT-2 in 1984,14 and then
two Utah-built spacecraft: NUSAT15 in 1985 and WO18 (Webersat) in 1990.16 These first four are unusual
compared to recent university-class missions in three
respects: they are relatively large (Webersat was by far
the smallest at 16 kg, while the rest average more than
50 kg), they all had “real” missions (UoSAT-1 had
electromagnetic
science
instruments,
NUSAT
demonstrated radar calibration for the FAA, and all but
NUSAT were OSCAR-designated spacecraft in the
Amateur Radio service), and they all functioned for an
extremely long time (NUSAT de-orbited after 20
months, and the others operated for more than 8 years –
more than 20 for UoSAT-2).

For U.S. universities, two watershed events took place
in this time period. The second (CubeSats) will be
discussed in the report on the Class of 2000, below.
The first is the formation of the AFRL/NASA/AIAA
University Nanosat Program;26 this design competition
serves to motivate and educate engineering students in
spacecraft design, with the winning school getting a
Space Test Program-sponsored launch of its 30-kg-class
satellite. By the time this paper is written, almost every
U.S. university known to be building a spacecraft
bigger than 10 kg is an active or past participant in the
University Nanosat Competition.

Before continuing, we must digress for a special
explanation regarding the spacecraft built/supervised by
Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL).
This
organization has trained dozens of spacecraft engineers
through the design, integration and operation of
spacecraft. Most of their missions would appear to fit
the university-class definition. However, because of
the resources invested, the capabilities of the spacecraft
and the specific training processes used, most SSTLclass missions fall outside the intended meaning of
“university-class satellite.” To simplify the discussion,
we only consider the first two UoSATs to be universityclass, plus KITSAT-1 (1992) and Tsinghua-1 (2000).

Finally, it should also be noted that the number of
active university-class projects in this decade far
exceeds the number on the launch manifest. Some of
these schools make the list in the next decade, while a
significant number either never complete their
spacecraft or never find a launch. For the sake of
illustration, we point out that student papers presented
at this Conference from 1993-2000 included missions
in development at Iowa State,27 Brigham Young, San
Jose State,28 University of Arizona,29 University of
Central Florida,30 University of Washington,31 Virginia
Tech,31 and UC Boulder.32

The other point to note from this first decade is how
few university-class launched. This is as much a
reflection of the state of the engineering world before
the electronics revolution of the late ‘80s as it is an
indication of how long it takes student programs to
launch their first spacecraft. A number of universities
will start spacecraft engineering programs by the end of
this decade, but no others will launch, yet.

We do not include these references to belittle the
activities of these programs, rather, we include them to
illustrate that the odds are stacked against a university
even completing its spacecraft, much less launching it
and having it operate successfully. As a further
example, of the 10 schools to participate in the
inaugural University Nanosat competition, only 1
school has subsequently put hardware in space
(Stanford, and it was a CubeSat33); three other Nanosat
schools lost their 2-spacecraft project (3CornerSat) on
the first flight of the Delta IV Heavy.34

1991-2000: The Phantom Menace
Within a few years, university-class spacecraft
programs became active at Stanford University17,
Arizona State University,18, 19 Weber State University,
and the U.S. service academies,20 among others – with
an equal number at schools in Europe,21, 22 Africa,23 and
Asia.24, 25 And, especially in the latter half of this
decade, those programs start finding their way into orbit
– a whopping 30 spacecraft in all, including 13 in the
Swartwout
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Based on the data, we can only conclude that the
JAWSAT mission has had disproportionate influence
on professional opinion. Although this is hardly
surprising: JAWSAT was an extremely visible DoDsponsored mission, and only 5 U.S.-built universityclass spacecraft had flown in the previous 15 years.
This mission was the first time that many industry
professionals had worked with university projects.
And, since JAWSAT, only five U.S.-built spacecraft
bigger than 12 kg have been launched (PCSat-1,40
PCSat-2, Sapphire,41 and 3CS34) – and even though the
three that reached orbit all were successful, we believe
that the shadow of JAWSAT still hangs over American
university-class missions.

The Class of 2000: Murphy Strikes Back
There are two reasons why the year 2000 deserves
special consideration. First, this year must be viewed
as both the low- and high-water marks for universityclass spacecraft (although 2006 may exceed it, in more
ways than one). Second, the CubeSat specification
traces its heritage to a spacecraft launched in 2000.
As noted above, twelve university-class spacecraft were
launched in 2000, the most ever in any year (the
previous high was five, although, admittedly, this
record will be shattered by the next Dnepr CubeSat
launch). In fact, seven of the twelve were on the same
rocket: the 26 January 2000 first-flight of the Minotaur
carried the Air Force Academy/Weber State JAWSAT
spacecraft,35 which in turn hosted FalconSat-1,36
ASUSat-1,37 and Opal,38 plus a DoD optical calibration
sphere; in turn, Opal carried three spacecraft built by
Santa Clara University39 and one more amateur-built
and two more professional spacecraft.

Still, the JAWSAT launch did nothing to kill the
interest or enthusiasm of university projects. In fact,
the Opal mission (Figure 1) marks the second
watershed event of this decade. The primary mission of
Stanford’s Orbiting Picosatellite Automated Launcher
(OPAL, or, as commonly used, Opal) was to
demonstrate deployable spacecraft technologies: six
hockey-puck sized “picosatellites” were deployed from
Opal several days after launch (Aerospace Corp.’s
PICOSAT 1 & 2, the Amateur payload StenSat, and
three from Santa Clara University: Thelma, Louise,
and JAK).

Not only were the numbers higher than ever before, but
the year 2000 began with the highest level of
enthusiasm for university-class spacecraft. At the time,
JAWSAT and similar international multi-spacecraft
university missions were viewed as the first of many
secondary launch opportunities for the growing stable
of completed or soon-to-be-completed student-built
spacecraft, including all 10 of the University Nanosat
teams. Then, unfortunately, three things happened: in
January, 6 of the 7 university-class spacecraft on
JAWSAT failed; in March, the “dot com” bubble burst
(the NASDAQ index losing more than 70% of its value
by year’s end), and Iridium filed for bankruptcy
protection in November. The latter two events caused a
severe contraction in the launch industry – all but
eliminating the secondary launch market for
universities; the first event may have had an even more
profound impact.
While we cannot point to a specific reference or
interview, we believe that the aerospace industry takes
a rather dim view of the performance and reliability of
university-class spacecraft. While we do not disagree
with their opinion on performance (which we will
discuss, below), the data does not seem to support the
belief that student-built spacecraft are unreliable.
Setting aside the JAWSAT launch for the moment, only
10 of 55 university-class spacecraft (18%) have failed
on-orbit. Even including JAWSAT, that numbers
grows to a not-terrible-for-students 16 of 62 (26%,
especially considering that Opal’s three “failed”
university-class picosatellites were sub-500-gram,
battery-powered devices; it would have been more
surprisingly had they all operated successfully!).
Finally, it should be noted that after JAWSAT, only 6
of 34 have failed (18%, again, and 4 of them CubeSats).
Swartwout

Figure 1. Opal [courtesy Stanford SSDL].
While the picosats themselves had mixed results (only
the two PICOSATs were ever heard from), the picosat
launcher itself was extremely successful. In fact, Opal
is the direct predecessor to the CubeSat standard and PPOD developed by Stanford and Cal Poly.42 According
to Stanford’s Robert Twiggs, the idea for the 10 cm
cube, 1-kg specification sprung from the success of
Opal’s launcher, the request by picosat providers for a
little bit more volume, and the tremendous discrepancy
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between the time it took for Opal to be designed, built
and launched (5 years) and the period of the picosats
(less than 18 months, and some less than 6 months). It
was believed that shrinking the spacecraft to these
dimensions would both cut development time and
increase the number and frequency of secondary launch
opportunities.

only 6 of the 28 spacecraft launched since 2001 having
a mass over 40 kg.
The shift towards CubeSats has also brought about two
more trends: a sharp reduction in the number of “realworld” missions (e.g. communications or technology
development) and a sharp increase in the failure rates
(due to a failure rate among CubeSats of 40%).

In terms of sheer numbers, by the middle of the next
decade, CubeSats will become the dominant universityclass project worldwide, with as many as 70
documented CubeSat projects in development, and
possibly 31 CubeSat-class spacecraft launched from
2003-2006 (including those released from the
analogous Japanese-built launcher and the DoDequivalent MEPSI launcher, but not counting more than
a dozen more industry and amateur-built CubeSat-sized
spacecraft).

2006-2010: A New, New Hope?
Predicting future launches of university-class spacecraft
is a futile exercise; not only are university program
managers endlessly optimistic about when their
spacecraft will be finished, but their dependence on
secondary launches means they can be delayed for any
number of reasons. For example, the late June 2006
Dnepr launch carrying the CubeSat portfolio was once
scheduled for August 2004.

2001-2006: Attack of the BeepSats

Still, for the purposes of illustration, we list in Table 2
those missions which have a confirmed, manifested
launch date. Other spacecraft are nearing completion
(such as the University of Texas’ FASTRAC43 and
Berlin’s LAPAN-TUBSAT44) and will be added to the
list when their manifests are announced.

The first six years of this decade have seen a steady rise
in the number of international launches and the
beginning in 2003 of what is becoming a flood of
CubeSats. Not surprisingly, the average mass of
university-class spacecraft is down dramatically, with

Table 2. Manifested University-Class Launches, second half of 2006.
Mass
(kg)
Spacecraft
Primary School(s)
Nation
ION
University of Illinois
USA
2
SACRED
University of Arizona
USA
1
Rincon
University of Arizona
USA
1
ICE CUBE1
Cornell University
USA
1
KUTESat
University of Kansas
USA
1
Ncube
Norwegian Universites
Norway
1
HAUSAT-1
Hankuk Aviation University
S. Korea
1
SEEDS
Nihon University
Japan
1
MEROPE
Montana State University
USA
1
CP2
Cal Poly San Luis Obispo
USA
1
CP1
Cal Poly San Luis Obispo
USA
1
ICE CUBE2
Cornell University
USA
1
Mea Huaka'i
University of Hawaii
USA
1
ALMASat
University of Bologna
Italy
25
Baumanets 1
Bauman Moscow State Technical University
Russia
100?
RAFT-1
US Naval Academy
USA
1
MARScom
US Naval Academy
USA
1
CP4
Cal Poly San Luis Obispo
USA
1
CAPE-1
University of Louisiana
USA
1
CP3
Cal Poly San Luis Obispo
USA
1
Libertad-1
University of Sergio Arboleda
Columbia
1
MAST
Stanford
USA
3
Falconsat 3
US Air Force Academy
USA
50
NPSAT1
Naval Postgraduate School
USA
80
MidSTAR-1
US Naval Academy
USA
120
Swartwout
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Launcher
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
STS-116
STS-116
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Dnepr
Atlas 5
Atlas 5
Atlas 5
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Types of Spacecraft

Even without the almost-ready-but-not-firm launches,
the manifest for the last 6 months of 2006 is staggering:
twenty-five spacecraft (including 20 CubeSats). That is
more than the previous four years combined (which
were pretty good years for university-class spacecraft
launches), and twice as many as were launched in the
previous banner year of 2000.

As outlined above, university-class spacecraft have split
into two distinct activities: the 30-kg-class University
Nanosat Program sponsored by AIAA, NASA and
AFRL (with equivalent-scale, government-sponsored
programs in other countries64-67); and the 1-kg-class
CubeSat program jointly developed by Stanford and
Cal Poly San Luis Obispo and adopted by dozens of
schools. Several schools are pursuing both CubeSatclass and Nanosat-class missions, but most have
focused on one or the other.

What is the implication of 25 new university-class
spacecraft? Well, if the statistics hold, it means that 1
of the 5 larger spacecraft will fail, and at least 8 of the
20 CubeSats will fail. If the real numbers are worse
than average, than 2006 may eclipse 2000 in terms of
the professional opinion of student-built satellites (and,
especially in the U.S. the ability of university projects
to get sponsorship and launches). On the other hand, a
success rate equal to or better than average may make
2006 the most important year (so far) in the history of
university-class spacecraft.

Also, increasingly, university-class spacecraft lack a
true payload: either the spacecraft’s mission is only to
return its own telemetry, or the instrument package has
been selected simply for the sake of having an
instrument package (e.g., Sapphire41).
And, while it is not a perfect predictor, it should be
noted that most of the flagship universities provide
“real” payloads, while many of the non-flagship do not
(especially in the last ten years).

In fact, regardless of the outcome, 2006 is shaping up to
be the most important year in the history of universityclass spacecraft.

Types of Launches
With the exception of the dedicated JAWSAT launch,
every university-class spacecraft has flown as either a
secondary or part of a large group of secondaries
(sometimes without an established primary). The latter
option is becoming increasingly common, led by the
Russian launch systems such as the Dnepr; it is no
longer strange to see 5 or more spacecraft manifested
on the same platform. This is a positive trend for
universities, especially for the non-flagship, because it
opens up the opportunity to share the launch costs
among many programs. It also provides automatic
teaming and mentoring arrangements between comanifested missions.

OBSERVATIONS
By considering the missions in Tables 1 & 2 as a whole,
several observations become apparent:
Types of Universities
Universities involved in spacecraft-building can be split
into two relevant categories: flagship universities, and
everyone else. By “flagship” university, we mean a
school that has been designated by the government as a
lead center for spacecraft engineering research and
development.
While the amounts vary, flagship
universities by definition enjoy significant government
sponsorship, including financial support, industry
mentoring and launches.
Examples of flagship
universities are the U.S. Naval and Air Force
Academies,36, 40, 45 and Naval Postgraduate School,46
Germany’s Technical University of Berlin,21, 44, 47, 48
Italy’s University of Rome La Sapienza,49-53 the Korean
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology,24, 25, 54-60
Israel’s Technion Institute,61 Saudi Arabia’s King
Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology, China’s
Tsinghua University, Japan’s University of Tokyo and
Tokyo Institute of Technology, and Canada’s
University of Toronto.62, 63

However, for U.S. universities, the fact that most multimanifest launches are coming out of Russia means that
ITAR restrictions must be managed. Several schools,
including Cal Poly and the University of Toronto, have
taken on the specialized role of international launch
broker for university-class missions.
Repeat Business
To date, 35 universities (or university teams) have built
62 spacecraft. Of those 35, only 16 universities have
participated in more than one mission. Of those 16, one
was Surrey (who “graduated” to SSTL) and only 3
others are not flagships (Stanford, Arizona State and
Weber State – and Weber State stopped with
JAWSAT). By the end of 2006, we anticipate there
will be 14 first-time schools added to the list. There
will also be two new multi-mission schools (Naval
Postgraduate School and Cal Poly – only the 4th nonflagship school) and three schools adding to their lists.

Non-flagship universities must find other means of
support, such as internal funding, research sponsorship,
or more general space education funds such as NASA
Space Grant. Not surprisingly, there have been fewer
non-flagship launches than flagship launches
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which ground operators could not recover (e.g. loss of
uplink or a disconnect between batteries and solar
arrays). While we cannot presume to know what was
and was not tested, it would appear that rigorous,
extensive fully-integrated functional testing might have
caught these problems before launch.

In other words, 19 non-flagship universities flew
spacecraft on only one mission, and of that set, only 6
are known to be building a second. For whatever
reason, the faculty, student, administrative and financial
resources that were assembled for the first spacecraft
have not been available for a second; it is very difficult
for universities without strong, consistent support from
a government or industry sponsor to stay in the small
satellite game. It will be very interesting to see how
many of the 14 first-times in 2006 stay around for a
second.

What Doesn’t Break?
On the other hand, there are some surprising absences
from that list. For example, despite a reliance on
converted commercial (actually, terrestrial) electronics,
the only recorded instance of a university-class
spacecraft lost to radiation events is TUBSAT-B, which
was sitting in the Van Allen belts. Perhaps COTS
electronics in low-Earth orbit are more rugged than we
though?

What Breaks First?
Whether out of embarrassment, proprietary concerns, or
simply a lack of interest, university-class missions are
notoriously bad about publishing (or perhaps writing?)
failure reports. The following information is the
author’s best guess based on news articles and the few
published failure reports.

Similarly, neither batteries nor solar arrays were the
established root cause any failures. Granted, battery
failure is an extremely likely root cause in the loss of
the SCU picosats and possible in the other CubeSats.
Still, in the author’s experience with Sapphire,
modestly-performing NiCad batteries are surprisingly
forgiving to student operators who mistreat them. (It is
arguable that Sapphire’s batteries had exceeded their
functional lifetime before launch, and they still
performed well for 30 months on-orbit.)

Of the 16 spacecraft we have identified as failing
prematurely, the failures can be attributed to (or
guessed to be) the following:
• Radiation: 1 (TUBSAT-B). Killed by the Van
Allen Belts due to its 1250 km orbit altitude.
• Launch interface: 1 (Mozhayets 5). Failed to
separate from the launch vehicle; not clear whether
it was a launcher, launch interface or spacecraft
problem.
• Thermal: 1 (UNAMSAT-B); UNAMSAT’s uplink
oscillator was too cold before launch and the
spacecraft could not be contacted in time to change
the battery charging parameters for the cold
conditions, and the system failed.
• Communications: 2½ (Arsene, SEDsat [partial],
JAWSAT).
These three spacecraft were
operational for at least a little bit of time, but lost
either their transmitters or receivers (or both)
unexpectedly. Bad wiring is suspected in some.
• Power: 3½
(SEDSat [partial], ASUSat-1,
FalconSAT-1, SSETI-Express). The reasons vary,
but all of these vehicles had problems, typically
with the connection between batteries and solar
arrays.
• Unknown: 7 (JAK, Louise, Thelma, AAU
Cubesat, CanX-1, DTUsat, NCube II). These
seven spacecraft were confirmed to have released,
but contact was never made.
Either bad
communications or bad power is suspected.

Also, the relatively benign thermal environment of LEO
and the rugged thermal allowances of COTS
components (where it is unusual for electronic devices
not to operate in the full range of -15 C to +80 C) team
up for a forgiving thermal design environment.
UNAMSAT-B’s main thermal problems were driven by
launch conditions in Russia, not by orbital conditions.
Finally, with the exception of Mozhayets 5, none of the
other 61 university-class spacecraft are known to have
experienced structural failures. Part of this is no doubt
due to the fact that vibration/static testing is both
effective in catching problems before launch and
mandated by launch providers. Part of this is probably
due to the fact that student spacecraft are rarely massoptimized, meaning that they opt for manufacturable
and/or high-margin structures over mass savings.
Finally, this is partly due to the favorable scaling laws
for small structures – small structures have inherently
lower bending moments and higher natural frequencies,
which give student designers additional cushion.
Again, while no one should discount the importance of
sound structural & thermal analysis/testing, nor should
students ignore the risks of COTS electronics, the
launch history suggests that more time needs to be
devoted to system-level functional testing.

Arguably, all of the known failures save TUBSAT-B,
and potentially many of the unknown failures, can be
attributed to incomplete system-level testing or systemlevel design. In all those cases, either the spacecraft
was in an unexpected operational environment, or a
component failure led to an operational mode from
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engineers but, with a few notable exceptions, produce
only marginally-capable spacecraft and marginallyrelevant missions. Many university-class missions are
internally-motivated; participants see spacecraft as an
exciting and relevant way to teach engineering. The
payload (if there is one) exists to justify the spacecraft,
not the other way around.

Why Do Universities Build Spacecraft?
Building, launching and operating spacecraft is a lot of
work. Any of the students who have begun the process
can attest to that, and many confess that, had they fully
understood the amount of effort required, they may not
have signed up. And yet, dozens of universities are
joining the “space club”, and a small-but-growing set
are even starting a second (or third) mission. Why?

Those universities attempting to fly “real” payloads
face a different problem:
after JAWSAT, the
developers of real payloads are justifiably hesitant to
risk their components on unproven spacecraft, yet
without a real payload, the universities cannot gain the
flight experience to prove their capabilities. Even with
a real payload, universities still have the challenge of
finding an affordable launch. Because the cost-perkilogram of launch is so high, spacecraft must be
extremely reliable and have a compelling mission.
And, proper development, integration and testing
require significant infrastructure.
Non-flagship
universities with research-driven university-class
missions almost never make it to orbit.

In reading through dozens of pre- and post-launch
university-class mission reports, we have observed
three major motivations. In decreasing order of
importance, they are:
• Inspiration. The idea that a student could put their
hands on something that will go into orbit has
undeniable cachet. The emotional appeal of space
flight is the overwhelming motivation for both
students and faculty participants. This emotional
aspect also serves as a way to recruit students to
consider careers in the space industry.
• Education. It is accepted practice that projectbased, hands-on activities are excellent tools for
teaching both systems-level engineering and
specific disciplines. In addition, it has been our
experience that employers preferentially select
students with project experience.
Thus, the
spacecraft becomes a tool for preparing students
for their professional careers.
• Research. At almost every school (especially
among the new CubeSat projects), the value of the
mission is in the building and launching of the
spacecraft, not in what the spacecraft can do. The
exception to that rule has been the flagship
universities; because of their government
sponsorship, these schools not only have incentives
to fly “real” payloads, but also access to “real”
payload providers through their government.

Lacking compelling payloads and lacking the resources
to attract such payloads, most student projects focus
almost entirely on training.
Clearly, this is a
worthwhile objective; many students (including the
authors) have benefited from hands-on engineering
experience despite the lack of “real” payload.
However, this approach is not sustainable. Reviewing
Table 1, most programs with education-only satellites
succeed in launching only one spacecraft (if they launch
anything at all).
Rather than attempt to mimic professional spacecraft,
student projects should play to their strengths: their
tolerance for risk and ability to use their space assets to
test revolutionary concepts. The reduced capabilities
and simple design inherent to student-built spacecraft
makes them ideal for short-term/limited demonstrations
of new operations concepts and technologies – such as
autonomy, inspection, servicing, robotic assembly, or
higher-risk methods for navigation and control. Such
mission objectives make it easier for projects to attract
outside sponsorship, and it provides students with a
more compelling goal.

OPINIONS
To this point in the paper, we have attempted to present
the facts of university-class spacecraft and discuss the
implications of those facts. Now, we will venture from
fact to opinion. We will first address the question of
possible missions, then discuss issues of mission scope
and component selection, and conclude with three
soapbox topics: the differences between Nanosat-class
and CubeSat-class spacecraft, the misleading usage of
micro/nano/pico designations, and, finally, the
existential question of whether university-class
missions should even exist.
Issue: What Should these Spacecraft Do?

Again looking at Table 1, one cannot help but notice
that from 1981-2001, the vast majority of universityclass spacecraft had an OSCAR designation; almost all
of those spacecraft carried one or more voice or packet
data repeaters for use by the Amateur community.
Since 2001, few missions have an OSCAR designation
and fewer still accommodate Amateur communications
as in previous missions.

Broadly speaking, university-class space projects are
effective at relevant, practical training for student

Anyone who spends any amount of time monitoring the
amsat-bb mailing list will note that there is a significant
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spacecraft terms, “Better a boring spacecraft that gets
finished and flies, than an amazing spacecraft that we
never complete.”

amount of confusion, skepticism or outright animosity
over the coming flood of Amateur-band-using
CubeSats; Amateurs are worried that these spacecraft
will use the amateur portion of the band without
providing services to the broader community.

The five design guidelines are:
Small spacecraft. Setting aside for the moment the
relationship between spacecraft mass and launch costs,
there are other advantages to students building very
small satellites. A smaller spacecraft improves mission
reliability; a small vehicle means fewer parts and fewer
interfaces,
which
improves
the ability to
comprehensively review and test every design,
component and interface before launch. Structural
performance benefits from the smaller frame; natural
frequencies increase and bending moments decrease
with decreased size. Therefore, it is easier for a very
small student-built spacecraft to pass flight safety
reviews.

In the author’s opinion, both the universities and
broader Amateur community are mission a golden
opportunity to collaborate: student education, project
mentoring and launch opportunities would improve
with a “real” communications payload, and the
Amateurs lose new blood and the chance to fly
payloads in the gaps between regular AMSATsponsored launches.
It appears that each side is waiting for the other to make
a move; one hopes that somebody takes it upon
themselves to do so, and soon.
Issue: How Should They Do It?

Common interfaces. The spacecraft-to-launch vehicle
interface is one of the most reviewed and risk-prone
aspects of the mission, especially for university-class
spacecraft. Costs can be significantly decreased and
reliability significantly increased through the use of
common interfaces and form factors across university
missions.

As noted above, while 80% of the spacecraft that reach
orbit survive, a much larger pool of spacecraft never
make it to the launch vehicle. And those non-flagship
programs that launch one spacecraft rarely launch a
second. The fundamental obstacle to building and
launching university-class spacecraft is cost;
universities can take years to complete a spacecraft and
even have it fail on orbit, and still consider it an
educational success; launch sponsors cannot. Unless
the cost of building, launching and operating universityclass spacecraft can be dramatically reduced, there will
be only limited opportunity for non-flagship
universities to participate.

For these reasons, common interfaces have already
been developed for several
types of university
spacecraft. Extremely small (1 kg) spacecraft have two
standardized interfaces:
the P-POD launcher for
CubeSats and the DoD launcher built for the MEPSI
program. AFRL and NASA have required the standard
use of Lightband for their Nanosats.

Such reductions have five requirements, outlined
below. While each requirement reduces cost while
maintaining (or improving) mission risk on its own,
these aspects taken together have a mutuallyreinforcing effect on university-class missions: they
guide students towards modestly-scoped missions that
can be accomplished in the near term with existing
hardware.

The question of whether these benefits would apply to
other aspects of student spacecraft (wiring harness,
power systems, data protocols) deserves further study.
Based on the common power problems of failed
missions, one would expect that a common power
subsystem design would be exceedingly useful.
Very short duration missions. Choosing missions
that can be accomplished in short durations (90 days or
less) has two benefits. The reduced scope allows for
higher-risk, lower-cost/mass components and higherrisk practices that are consistent with a short mission.
For example, powerful and inexpensive COTS
processors tend to be radiation-sensitive; reduced
mission times will reduce their potential exposure. On
the education side, a shorter-duration mission tends to
be simpler from both a development and operations
side, which gives students greater opportunities to see
an entire mission from concept through operations.
Both of these effects tend to make the spacecraft
smaller and less expensive, further improving the
launch performance.

In fact, “modest” is the overall theme of this section.
Students (the author included, once) are excessively
optimistic (some would say naïve) about their ability to
solve complex technical and integration problems.
Sometimes, this optimism is essential, for it helps
motivate the teams through the tough parts of the
project. But in many cases, it causes fledgling
spacecraft teams to take on entirely too many missions,
attempt too ambitious a technical challenge – and never
finish.
From unfortunate experience, the author advises
university programs to heed the advice of Gen. George
S. Patton, “Better a good plan violently executed today
than the perfect plan available next week.” Or, in
Swartwout
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However, the sheer size of a CubeSat (or lack thereof)
poses a tremendous constraint on power generation,
power storage, communications, and electronics design.
In some cases, the cost of miniaturizing components to
fit a CubeSat may outweigh the economic advantages
of launching a CubeSat instead of a Nanosat. The first
10 CubeSats have had an on-orbit failure rate double
that of larger spacecraft; perhaps this rate will decline
as a set of best practices are developed and adopted.
The Japanese flagships, for example are 4 for 4 on
CubeSat launches (which, in return, makes the
aggregate success rate of the other 6 CubeSats even
worse).

Large operational margins. These are student-built
spacecraft, which means that design and fabrication
errors may exist, and these are high-risk spacecraft,
which means that conceptual errors may exist. It is
essential to mitigate the effects of these errors by
building spacecraft with significant margins in mass,
power, computation, pointing and communications.
Students should not be expected to design and build
spacecraft that push the state-of-the-practice in
performance without giving them significant margins in
cost, schedule and flight operations. In other words,
non-flagship universities who want to finish their
project within the students’ academic lifetime should
avoid
missions
that
require
state-of-the-art
performance.

CubeSats also suffer from a perceived lack of value: of
the 30 CubeSat-class vehicles in orbit or ready for
launch in 2006, only 7 have any significant science or
technology demonstration element (QuakeSat, ION,
ICE CUBE1/2, RAFT, MARScom, Voyager). Only
one of those six has flown (QuakeSat), and it had
significant industry sponsorship.

Note that this is not the same as saying that nonflagship schools should avoid challenging missions.
But the challenge should come in terms of ground
operations, data processing, autonomy, etc. – not in
attempting to perform 3-axis, arcminute-level pointing
control on a 10 kg spacecraft.

Thus, a university should choose a CubeSat-class or
Nanosat-class mission based on its educational
objectives and student capabilities. CubeSats can be
designed and built more rapidly, provided that the
program is capable of developing miniature-scale
electronic subsystems, defines modest operational
capabilities, and perhaps most importantly, has access
to an Earth communications station capable of closing
the link with a low-power, low-gain, extremely small
spacecraft. Nanosat-class spacecraft have sufficient
margin to enable students to build less-optimized, lesscapable subsystems and still perform compelling
missions. Without a compelling mission, a Nanosatclass program will be hard pressed to find launch
sponsorship. While the $40,000 price for a CubeSatclass launch is certainly expensive, it does allow for
university programs with less-compelling missions to
reach orbit.

Rigorous functional and environmental testing. In
our missions, early vacuum and thermal cycle testing
identified
discrepancies
between
manufacturer
specifications and actual thermal behavior of key
components. More importantly, a functional prototype
is essential for success. It is our belief that many
student spacecraft fail due to lack of time to correct
problems in ground testing, especially in power
subsystems. (Note that the simpler the spacecraft – few
components, modest power needs, three or fewer
operational modes – the easier it is to integrate and thus
the more schedule that is available for testing.)
Issue: CubeSat v. (?) Nanosat
At present, approximately twenty U.S. schools have
developed or are developing Nanosat-class spacecraft,
with a half-dozen launched in the past 6 years. By
contrast, more than 90 schools worldwide are
developing CubeSat-class spacecraft, 1-kg, 10 cm cubes
that fit within a standard deployment mechanism.

Micro vs. Nano vs. Pico: Missing the Point
A significant amount of effort seems to be expended
coming up with an exact classification of spacecraft
size prefixes; as of this writing, the online Wikipedia
indicates that the cutoff between designations are at
powers of 10: 100 kg for microsats, 10 kg for nanosats,
1 kg for picosats, etc. In the author’s opinion, this
discussion is, at best, silly and, at worst, misleading.
There are two reasons for this opinion: the category
divisions are arbitrary and, more importantly, mass is
the wrong discriminator.

CubeSat-class spacecraft have several educational/
programmatic advantages over Nanosat-class systems.
The extremely small size of the spacecraft further
constrains design scope, improving the ability of a
small group of students to fully understand the entire
design. CubeSats have been launched as secondaries
on Russian rockets for on the order of $100,000 each,
with new orders for CubeSat launches announced at
$40,000 each. By contrast, Nanosat-class spacecraft
cost millions of dollars for a secondary launch. Thus,
most U.S. Nanosat-class programs depend on external
sponsorship, almost exclusively through the
Department of Defense.
Swartwout
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investment? If 40 students are involved in the
construction of a 1-kg spacecraft, how many of them
are receiving the true benefits of hands-on projects (i.e.,
the painful learning that comes from integration, system
failure and redesign?).

performance of objects in that category. For example,
automobile manufacturers distinguish between sedans,
compact cars and sport utility vehicles because each has
very different features and price points. In that regard,
the 1/10/100 kg breakpoints are particularly misleading.
For example, our university is developing a 3 kg
deployable inspector spacecraft, with a long-term goal
of reducing the vehicle size under 1 kg – in other
words, converting it from a “nanosat” to a “picosat”.
And yet, the only practical difference between these
two spacecraft will be that the “picosat” has a more
compact structural design and smaller (i.e. more
expensive) components.
Functionally, they will
perform the same tasks with the same level of accuracy.
But by calling one a “nanosat” and one a “picosat”, we
would be implying that there were some fundamental
difference between the two.

The question can be rephrased this way: can the
university’s education/research objectives be achieved
if the spacecraft never flies? If they can, then why
devote all the extra resources to the flight? Wouldn’t
the sponsors and students be better served by UAV,
balloon or even ground demonstrations (where flight
costs are in the dozens of dollars and re-flight times can
be measured in minutes or hours)? And if your
educational/research goals absolutely require a launch,
how can you reconcile that it can take 3-5 years (or
longer) from project inception to launch – even for
CubeSats – and, for larger spacecraft, there is an
extremely high probability that the spacecraft will not
find a launch or, more likely, never be finished?

For university-class spacecraft below about 60 kg, mass
is the wrong discriminator. While it is generally true
that the lower the spacecraft mass, the lower the cost of
the launch, this only applies to orders-of-magnitude
changes in launch mass (1000 kg vs. 100 kg vs. 10 kg)
and is most relevant for primary payloads; a 10 kg
spacecraft may not cost any less to fly in a secondary
opportunity than a 30 kg vehicle, and the real launch
costs for very small vehicles are driven by integration,
flight safety and documentation expenses.

These questions are raised because of the very real
possibility that the number of secondary launch
opportunities will not increase at the same rate as the
number of new schools wanting to fly spacecraft (if the
launch opportunities increase at all). In the University
Nanosat Competition, for example, there is a roughly 2
to 1 ratio between applicants and selected participants,
and a 10 to 1 ratio between selected participants and
sponsored launches. (Recall that 8 of the 10 original
Nanosat teams have not had their spacecraft launched.)
If it is true that only 1 in 20 Nanosat-class spacecraft
will make it to orbit, wow long can students be strung
along on the hope of an unlikely launch before they
leave the project?

In the author’s experience, U.S. launch providers are
indifferent to 5 kg or even 10 kg changes to the mass of
a university-class payload; while these changes are
enormous with respect to the satellite, they are within
the noise of the launch vehicle performance. Try to
change your spacecraft’s footprint or dynamic
envelope, however, and it’s a different story.

Thus, the success or failure of the CubeSat Class of
2006 becomes even more important. If a significant
fraction fail, it may indicate that most universities are
not cut out to fly CubeSats and there may be a backlash
among the Nanosat-scale vehicles, too. If a significant
fraction succeed, then CubeSats may yet

That is why we believe that volume is the true
indicator. Volume dictates whether your spacecraft fits
on the launch vehicle, how big a solar array can be
accommodated, the size of sensor and communications
apertures – in short, volume is a strong reflection of the
mission and capabilities of a spacecraft.

In the author’s opinion, the opportunities for systemslevel training in spacecraft engineering provided by the
University Nanosat Program are worth the long odds
against launch. On the other hand, if all 100+
universities worldwide active in spacecraft hardware
opted to build Nanosat-class vehicles, the backlog
would never clear.

If volume is not a convenient discriminator, another
useful parameter would be launch interface – knowing
whether the spacecraft fits in a P-POD/MEPSI or on an
ESPA/Lightband-type interface provides a tremendous
amount of information about the satellite’s expected
performance.

At the very least, it is imperative that university-class
mission managers understand the costs, schedule
implications and long odds of university-class missions.
Missions which have relevant pre-flight demonstrations
are superior to those that can only be tested on-orbit,
simply because of the opportunities that provides

Is This the Best Use of Our Time?
The most important question raised by this study is also
the hardest to answer: given that the cost of design,
fabrication, launch and operations is in the high tens of
thousands of dollars for CubeSats and in the millions
for larger spacecraft, given that the on-orbit returns are
marginal, are university-class spacecraft worth the
Swartwout
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• Asserted that mass is the wrong discriminator for
under 60 kg university-class spacecraft. Specifying
the volume and/or launch interface provides a
richer understanding of the design.
• Opened the door to the idea that maybe, just
maybe, schools are throwing their limited resources
at satellites when perhaps terrestrial robotic
projects would be more cost-effective.

students for realistic demonstrations during their
academic lifetimes.
CONCLUSIONS
Universities around the world have discovered that
hands-on student satellite projects are an excellent way
to educate and motivate students in all aspects of
spacecraft engineering.
However, the real-world
constraints that come with building real-world
spacecraft have proven to be very taxing, and only a
very few universities have had sustained spacecraftbuilding activities.

Mission Design and Mission Risk
In choosing payloads, there is an important difference
between mission risk and flight safety risk; for
university-class spacecraft to succeed, this difference
must be clearly identified by both universities and their
launch sponsors. Spacecraft designs or practices that
lead to unsafe vehicle behavior during launch or
separation poses a threat to the entire launch campaign
and should be managed using well-established design,
integration and test practices.

Review of Key Ideas
In this paper, we accomplished the following:
• Defined “university-class” missions as those
student-built satellites where student training plays
at least as important a role as the orbiting mission.
• Identified the 62 university-class missions that
have launched to date and the 25 manifested for
launch by the end of 2006.
• Recognized that the on-orbit success rate is better
than expected: only 16 of 62 failed prematurely;
which drops to 10 of 55 if one discounts the badluck day of the JAWSAT launch.
• Observed that the ill-fated JAWSAT launch has
had a disproportionate influence on professional
opinion of university-class spacecraft.
• Identified that there are two categories of
university-class programs:
the governmentsponsored flagships and the non-flagships.
Mission types, success rates and reflight rates
between the two groups are distinctly different.
• Suggested that structural and thermal design of
university-class spacecraft has been adequate, but
that power and communications need more
attention, especially at the level of system
integration and functional testing.
• Encouraged schools to attempt “real”, relevant
payloads, not only from the educational value of
the effort but as a way of reversing the negative
opinion of university-class missions and, more
importantly, to tackle research problems that are
not being addressed in industry. Perhaps the most
relevant payload that a fledgling space program
could adopt would be an Amateur radio repeater.
• Provided five guidelines for effective mission
design: small vehicles, common interfaces, short
missions, large margins and rigorous testing.
• Sidestepped the “CubeSat v. Nanosat” debate by
recognizing that different schools will be better
able to accommodate the strengths and weaknesses
of each category .

Swartwout

Mission risk, on the other hand, are those designs or
practices that do not pose a flight safety risk but might
threaten the on-orbit performance of the vehicle. While
mission risk should be minimized, many important
demonstrations accessible to university projects will
carry significant mission risk, especially if they are to
be attempted within the constraints of a university-class
spacecraft.
In the author’s experience, mission
managers and flight safety engineers often do not
distinguish between flight risk and mission risk; failing
to draw this distinction places additional, unnecessary
burdens on the university development team. Much
work remains to be done to convince design reviewers
to allow universities to carry their own mission risk.
Closing Thoughts
While both the 30 kg Nanosat-class and 1-kg CubeSatclass vehicles fill relevant portions of the trade space
for university projects, the existence of these classes
and the significant discrepancy in size and expected
operational lifetime raise important questions for future
work. In particular, while these very small spacecraft
are considered to be “better” for hands-on design
projects than 100 kg vehicles, is there a bottom limit to
size?
Would 100 gram spacecraft better lend
themselves to student design, integration and launch
opportunities, or would the technological complexities
and mission limitations eliminate the value of small
size?
Similarly, while shorter mission lifetimes
improve the design and education process, is there a
practical limit to mission length? Could a one-day
mission be justified in terms of technical relevance as
well as the months (or years) of student development
leading up to launch? Could all of the fundamental
educational objectives be met with significantly-lessexpensive suborbital flights lasting a few minutes?
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Answering these questions will require a more
comprehensive survey of university-class missions,
both in the U.S. and abroad.

9.

Perhaps the most interesting development in the history
of university-class spacecraft has been the rise of the
CubeSat projects; more schools are presently
developing CubeSats than the total number of previous
university-class spacecraft. As discussed above, the
launch of 25 university-class spacecraft in the second
half of 2006 will dramatically change. It is not at all
clear whether this will be a change for the better, or for
the worse.
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